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Articles
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology:
Two Challenges To Responsibility from
Neuroscience
Stephen J. Morse *
I. INTRODUCTION
Free will and human agency are considered foundational
for ascriptions of criminal responsibility in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. As United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes famously observed, “even a dog distinguishes
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between being stumbled over and being kicked.” 1 And, as
Justice Jackson wrote in Morissette v. U.S., concisely noting
both conditions:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation
between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory “But I didn’t
mean to”. . . . 2

Now, however, the discoveries of the new neuroscience
The new
challenge both foundations for responsibility. 3
neuroscience seems poised to demonstrate that our behavior is
determined by physical events in the brain and that we
therefore cannot be responsible. Neuroscientific discoveries
also are alleged to demonstrate that mental states do not
causally explain our behavior. If this is true, it provides
another, independent ground for the claim that responsibility is
impossible.
I argue that neither challenge succeeds. The challenge to
free will from neurophysical determinism is familiar to similar
challenges in the past, but it fails for three reasons. First, free
will is not a criterion for the application of any legal rule.
Second, free will is not foundational for criminal responsibility.
Third, there is a philosophically plausible response to those
who claim that determinism—whether based on the theories
and findings of neuroscience or any other discipline—and
responsibility are incompatible. Thus, I conclude that, for the
moment, the positive doctrines of legal and moral responsibility
are normatively safe from the newest metaphysical assault.
The neuroscientific attack on agency is more troubling because
it claims that the presumptions of morality and the law about
human agency are inconsistent with our new understanding of
the link between brain and behavior. Roughly speaking, the
law implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the person,
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (Transaction ed.
2005) (1963).
2. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).
3. I recognize that legal and moral responsibility need not coincide.
Because Anglo-American punishment theory holds that desert is a necessary
condition for punishment—at least at the core of criminal law—I shall assume
that moral and legal responsibility do coincide in the core.

MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36.

2008] DETERMINISM & THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCH.

3

which explains behavior in terms of desires, beliefs and
intentions. If practical reason plays no role in explaining our
behavior, as some neuroscientists and others claim, current
responsibility doctrines and practices would have to be
radically altered or jettisoned altogether. I suggest, however,
that the conceptual and scientific support for this argument is
thin at present and that there is good ground to believe that
our conception of persons as agents is unlikely to disappear.
Consequently, legal and moral doctrines that depend on agentic
personhood are secure—at least for now.
The paper proceeds as follows: part II briefly describes the
law’s concept of the responsible person and demonstrates that
free will is not a criterion of legal responsibility in general and
criminal responsibility in particular.
Thus, even if
determinism or universal causation is a true account of the
metaphysics of the universe, this truth cannot cast doubt
generally on specific legal criteria. Part III considers the
metaphysical free will problem and shows that free will is also
not foundational for responsibility. Neurophysical determinism
is akin to genetic, psychological, or sociological determinism
and subject to the same compatibilist responses that have
deflected earlier deterministic challenges.
In sum,
determinism is irrelevant to positive law, even if it is true. Part
IV addresses the allegedly disappearing person. It reconsiders
the folk-psychological concept of the person embedded in law
and morality and identifies philosophical arguments and types
of evidence that would justify abandoning the commonsense
conception. It then canvasses the evidence for the current
assault on agency from neuroscience and allied disciplines and
concludes that folk psychology is alive and well. The person is
most definitely visible. Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. THE NON-PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN LAW
The genuine metaphysical problem about free will
concerns, roughly, whether human beings possess the ability or
power to act uncaused by anything other than themselves.
Such ability is often termed libertarian freedom, contra-causal
freedom, agent origination and the like. But there is no such
problem in law. The importance of having this power or ability
results from the controversial belief that libertarian freedom
underwrites the possibility of holding people genuinely
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responsible. 4
Solving the free will problem would have
profound implications for responsibility doctrines and practices,
such as blame and punishment, but, at present, having or
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or
criminal law doctrine. Law addresses problems genuinely
related to responsibility, including consciousness, the formation
of mental states such as intention and knowledge, the capacity
for rationality, and compulsion, but it never addresses the
presence or absence of free will. 5 People sometimes use “free
will” loosely to refer to genuine responsibility doctrines, but
this distracts from the real issues and perpetuates confusion.
The only practical free will problem in law is the confusion
among lawyers, scientists and others who think that free will is
a legal criterion or who speak and write as if it is.
A. THE LEGAL VIEW OF THE PERSON
Consciousness and action are central to the law’s view of
the person. The capacity for intentional activity or stillness—
the capacity for agency—is a central aspect of personhood and
is integral to what it means to be a responsible person. We act
because we intend. Responsibility judgments depend on the
mental states that produce and accompany bodily movement
and stillness. This is how we think about ourselves, and this is
the concept of the person that morality and law both reflect.
The law’s view of the person is thus the so-called “folkpsychological” model: a view of the person as a conscious (and
potentially self-conscious) creature capable of practical reason,
4. See ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL 1–
5 (2005); GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME, at viii-ix (2006); Editorial, Free
to Choose? Modern Neuroscience Is Eroding the Idea of Free Will, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 23, 2006, at 16.
5. It is virtually impossible to prove a negative, but perusal of any
American criminal code or judicial opinions will confirm the absence of
libertarian free will as a genuine criterion. On rare occasions, a statute might
include the phrase. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (2007) (Consent to
sexual activity must be “pursuant to an exercise of free will.”). It is clear,
however, that free will in such instances simply is a proxy for more familiar,
less metaphysical criteria, such as the absence of compulsion. Judges, too,
sometimes write as if freedom of the will were a foundation for responsibility.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952). Such locutions
are either unanalyzed boilerplate or once again are proxies for more familiar
responsibility criteria. Again, Part III infra explains why libertarian free will
is not required for criminal responsibility.
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an agent who forms and acts on intentions that are the product
of the person’s desires and beliefs. We are the sort of creatures
that can act for and respond to reasons. The law properly
treats persons generally as intentional creatures and not as
mechanical forces of nature. Law and morality are actionguiding 6 and could not guide people ex ante and ex post unless
people could use rules as premises in their practical reasoning.
Otherwise, law and morality as action-guiding normative
systems of rules would be useless, and perhaps incoherent.
Law is a system of rules that, at the least, is meant to guide or
influence behavior and thus to operate as a potential cause of
behavior. As John Searle wrote,
Once we have the possibility of explaining particular forms of human
behavior as following rules, we have a very rich explanatory
apparatus that differs dramatically from the explanatory apparatus
of the natural sciences. When we say we are following rules, we are
accepting the notion of mental causation and the attendant notions of
rationality and existence of norms. . . .
. . . The content of the rule does not just describe what is happening,
but plays a part in making it happen. 7

Legal and moral rules are not simply mechanistic causes
that produce “reflex” compliance. They operate within the
domain of practical reason. Agents are meant to and can only
use these rules as potential reasons for action as they
deliberate about what they should do. 8 Moral and legal rules
are thus action-guiding primarily because they provide an
agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or
action. Unless people are capable of understanding and then
using legal rules as premises in deliberation, law would be
powerless to affect human behavior. 9 People use legal rules as
6. SHER, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that although philosophers
disagree about the requirements and justifications of what morality requires,
there is widespread agreement that “the primary task of morality is to guide
action”); John R. Searle, End of the Revolution, 49 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 33, 35
(2002).
7. Searle, supra note 6, at 35.
8. Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6
LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000).
9. Id. at 131. This view assumes that law is sufficiently knowable to
guide conduct, but a contrary assumption is largely incoherent. As Shapiro
writes:
Legal skepticism is an absurd doctrine. It is absurd because the law
cannot be the sort of thing that is unknowable. If a system of norms
were unknowable, then that system would not be a legal system. One
important reason why the law must be knowable is that its function is
to guide conduct. Id.
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premises in the practical syllogisms that guide much human
action. No instinct governs how fast a person drives on the
open highway. However, among the various explanatory
variables, the posted speed limit and the belief in the
probability of suffering the consequences for exceeding it surely
play a large role in the driver’s choice of speed. Human
behavior can be modified by means other than influencing
deliberation and human beings do not always deliberate before
they act. Nonetheless, law operates through practical reason,
even when we most habitually follow the legal rules. Law can
directly and indirectly affect the world we inhabit only by its
influence on practical reason. 10
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must
always reason or consistently behave rationally according to
some pre-ordained, normative notion of rationality. Rather, the
law’s view is that people are capable of acting for reasons and
are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly
conventional, socially-constructed standards.
The type of
rationality the law requires is the ordinary person’s common
sense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be
acceptable within the disciplines of economics, philosophy,
psychology, computer science, and the like.
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be
praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished is the product of
mental causation 11 and, in principle, responsive to reason.
Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do wrong and they
cannot violate expectations about how people ought to live
together. Machines do not deserve praise, blame, reward,
punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or because
of the results they cause. Only people, intentional agents with
the potential to act, can violate expectations of what they owe
each other and only people can do wrong.

I do not assume that legal rules are always clear and thus capable of precise
action guidance. If most rules in a legal system were not sufficiently clear
most of the time, however, the system could not function. Further, the
principle of legality dictates that criminal law rules should be especially clear.
10. Id. at 131–32.
11. I do not mean to imply dualism here. I am simply accepting the folkpsychological view that mental states—which are fully produced by and
realizable in the brain—play a genuinely causal role in explaining human
behavior. See infra Part IV.
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B. THE GENERAL LEGAL CRITERIA FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND
EXCUSE
The law’s concept of responsibility follows logically from
the nature of law itself and its concept of the person. As a
system of rules that guides and governs human interaction, law
tells citizens what they may and may not do, what they must or
must not do, what abilities are required competently to perform
certain tasks, and what consequences will follow from their
conduct. If human beings were not rational creatures who
could understand the good reasons for action, including the
relevant facts and rules, and were not capable of conforming to
legal requirements through intentional action or forbearance,
the law would be powerless to affect human action. 12 Legally
responsible agents are therefore people who have the general
capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular
legal contexts. 13 For example, they must be generally capable
of properly using the rules as premises in practical reasoning.
The usual legal presumption is that most adults are so capable.
Note that the law requires possession of a general capacity
at the time in question rather than an exercise of that capacity.
Failure to exercise a capacity does not necessarily mean that
one lacks that capacity.
Indeed, acting irrationally and
foolishly is common even among people with the greatest
capacity for rational conduct. Under the law, if a person is
capable of exercising the capacity for rationality if there is good
reason to do so—as there always is when important interests
are at stake—then that person may be held responsible even if
she failed to exercise that capacity.
The general capacity for rationality is not self-defining. It
must be understood according to some contingent, normative
notion both of rationality and of how much capability is
required. For example, legal responsibility might require the
capability of understanding the reason for an applicable rule,
as well as the rule’s command and the consequence for failure
to comply.
These are matters of moral, political and,
ultimately, legal judgment, about which reasonable people
differ. There is no uncontroversial definition of rationality or of
the type and amount required for responsibility in various legal
contexts. These are normative issues and, whatever the
12. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 51–63
(1994).
13. Id. at 74–83.
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outcome might be within a polity and its legal system, the
debate is about human action—intentional behavior that is
responsive to reasons.
Now let us turn to the law’s excusing conditions, those
situations in which the agent will not be held responsible and
may be treated specially. If the general capacity for rationality
is the primary responsibility condition, then lack of that
capacity is the primary excusing condition. It explains, for
example, why young children, some people with dementia, and
some people with mental disorder are not held responsible, at
least in some contexts. Again, how much lack of capacity is
necessary to find the agent not responsible is a normative
moral, social, political, and ultimately legal issue. It is not a
scientific, medical, psychological or psychiatric issue. 14
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition, but it
is less well-understood than lack of rational capacity. 15 It is
useful first to distinguish cases of literal and metaphorical
compulsion. Literal compulsion exists when the person’s bodily
movement is a pure mechanism, the product of mechanistic
causes and is not rationalizable by the agent’s desires, beliefs
and intentions. 16 For example, if a much stronger person pulls
an agent’s arm and literally forces it against the head of a third
person despite the agent’s best efforts not to move his arm, the
movement of the arm is not the agent’s act at all. It is not a
product of his or her intention. For another example, a tremor
produced by a neurological disorder is not an action because it
is not intentional. Again, the movement of the arm is pure
mechanism.
In contrast, metaphorical compulsion exists when the
agent acts intentionally, but in response to some hard choice
imposed on the agent through no fault of his or her own. 17 In
cases of metaphorical compulsion, it is useful to distinguish two
party and one party cases. The former occurs when another
person threatens an agent by placing him or her in a “do-it-or14. Scientific or clinical evidence may help resolve legal questions, but the
ultimate issue is always legal and not scientific or clinical.
15. See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2002) (addressing the difficulty with compulsion
excuses and suggesting that most cases seeming to require such an excuse are
better understood in terms of irrationality).
16. Id. at 1055–63.
17. Id.

MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36.

2008] DETERMINISM & THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCH.

9

else” situation. For example, if a miscreant holds a gun to an
agent’s head and threatens to kill her unless she kills another
innocent person, it would be wrong to kill the innocent other. If
the agent does kill, however, the killing is fully intentional and
a perfectly rational response to the desire to live and to the
belief that she would otherwise be killed. Although it would be
wrong to kill under these circumstances, the law may decide as
a normative matter that the act should be excused because the
agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be
supremely difficult for most citizens to resist.
One party or internal compulsion cases are more difficult
to understand. Recognize, first, that if the internally compelled
agent is irrational, there is no need for an independent
compulsion excuse. Only in cases in which the agent is
seemingly rational do we need to consider compulsion. The
cases that most fit this category are “disorders of desire,” such
as addictions, paraphilias, compulsive gambling, pyromania,
and the like. Note again, however, that when the addict seeks
and uses substances, when the pedophile molests a child, when
the compulsive gambler places a bet, and when the pyromaniac
sets a fire, the agent is acting. She acts intentionally to satisfy
her craving for the purpose of achieving relief, of obtaining
pleasure, or of both. In these cases, if the person frequently
yields to his or her apparently very strong desires at great
social, occupational, or legal cost to herself, the agent will often
say that she could not help herself, that she was not in control.
Consequently, although the agent undeniably acted in response
to her desires, morality or the law may again hold that
metaphorically and normatively she was compelled and should
be excused.
Note that none of the law’s general criteria for
responsibility or excuse refers to free will or its absence. Lack
of action, lack of rationality, and compulsion all excuse, but
none of these conditions has anything to do with libertarian
freedom of the will. There may be problems conceptualizing
and evaluating the lack of rational capacity or compulsion.
These are real problems for law, but they are not free will
problems. Lawyers, scientists and forensic practitioners often
speak and write as if these are “free will” problems, as if lack of
free will were a synonym for lack of action, lack of rational
capacity, or compulsion. Nevertheless, free will is doing no
work whatsoever, independent of these genuine excusing
conditions, and it thus threatens to confuse the issues.
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To explore further the error of believing that there is a
genuine and independent free will problem in positive law, let
us turn specifically to criminal responsibility, which is the legal
context in which talk of free will is probably most common (and
most distracting).
C. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Current common law holds an agent prima facie criminally
responsible if the agent acts intentionally and with the
appropriate mental state, the mens rea, required by the
definition of the offense, such as purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence. Criminal law typically defines an
act as an intentional bodily movement performed by an agent
whose consciousness is reasonably intact. Mental states have
their ordinary language, common sense meanings. No degree
of commitment or rationality is included in the definitions of
mens rea. An act committed ambivalently for irrational
reasons is considered intentional if it was done on purpose.
Even if the agent is fully prima facie responsible, however, the
agent ultimately may still not be criminally responsible if an
excusing condition, an affirmative defense, such as legal
insanity (essentially a rationality defect) or duress (a
compelling “hard choice” situation, such as a “do-it-or-else”
threat at gunpoint) was present when the agent committed the
offense. Although one might quibble about details, and there is
substantial variation across jurisdictions, this account
accurately reflects Anglo-American law’s current, core
conception of criminal responsibility. 18
The logic of the foregoing account is that a defendant who
wants to avoid imputation of criminal responsibility must
create reasonable doubt about whether he or she acted
intentionally, consciously, and with the required mens rea, or
the defendant must establish an affirmative defense. 19 If the
18. Any good treatise will bear out this claim. See, e.g., JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2006).
19. I use the vague locution, “establish an affirmative defense,” because
the Supreme Court has made clear that the burden of persuasion for
affirmative defenses may be placed on the defendant. See, e.g., Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (permitting shifting the persuasion burden
for legal insanity to the defendant); Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437,
2442 (2006) (permitting shifting the persuasion burden for duress to the
defendant). The defendant will effectively retain the production burden,
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agent does not act at all because the bodily movement was not
intentional or the agent’s consciousness was substantially
compromised, the agent is not prima facie responsible. For
example, a reflex or behavior in an altered state of
consciousness, such as sleepwalking, will not be considered the
defendant’s action, even if the defendant’s bodily movements
caused a harm. 20 An agent who does not act is acquitted
outright. Similarly, if the agent lacks a requisite mental state,
the agent is also not prima facie criminally responsible and
must be acquitted outright of the crime requiring that mental
state. For example, suppose a defendant shoots a creature he
actually believes to be a space alien impersonating a police
officer, but the victim turns out to be a genuine police officer.
The shooting was an intentional action, but the defendant
cannot be convicted of intentional homicide of a person knowing
that the victim was a police office because he did not intend to
kill a human being and did not know the victim was a police
officer. 21 If he or she was sufficiently careless, however, the
defendant might be convicted of negligent homicide, defined as
killing in a situation in which a reasonable person should have
recognized that his or her conduct created a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death to a human being. 22
Like the definitions of crimes, affirmative defenses also
have specific criteria. Consider first the insanity defense, using
the Model Penal Code test as an example. To be found legally
insane, at the time of the crime the defendant must have been
suffering from a mental disorder and, as a result, lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his action
or to conform his action to the requirements of the law.23 Thus,
if the defendant is not sufficiently disordered to meet the law’s
definition of mental disorder, or did not lack the requisite
substantial capacity, a legal insanity defense will fail. Now,
consider the Model Penal Code standard for the affirmative
defense of duress. Duress is established if the defendant is
threatened with unlawful force—usually death or grievous
bodily harm—against his person unless he harms another, and
however, whether or not the state shifts the persuasion burden.
20. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 95.
21. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2717–18 (2006) (stating that
Defendant Clark claimed that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and
held these beliefs).
22. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 583–84.
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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a person of reasonable firmness would have yielded in this
situation. 24 The defense will fail if the threat was of lesser
force or a threat to destroy only the defendant’s valued
property, or if a person of reasonable firmness would not have
yielded, say, killing five people to save one’s own life.
To establish prima facie guilt or to defeat an affirmative
defense, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant had
free will. To defeat the prosecution’s prima facie case, the
defendant must simply cast reasonable doubt on the elements
of conscious, intentional action and mens rea. To establish an
affirmative defense, the defense must introduce sufficient
evidence of the criteria for the defense. To avoid criminal
responsibility either by negating the prosecution’s prima facie
case or by establishing an affirmative defense, the defendant
need not demonstrate that he or she lacked free will. People
often say that a defendant who acted under duress or who was
legally insane lacked free will. In such cases, however, free will
is simply a confusing and conclusory way to say that the
genuine legal criteria for excuse were met. Lack of free will,
independent of the behavioral legal criteria for excuse, does not
explain why such a defendant is excused.
For a final confirmation of the thesis that free will plays no
role in the positive criteria for criminal responsibility, consider
the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Clark v.
Arizona, in which the Supreme Court had a rare opportunity to
clarify the relation between mens rea and insanity. 25 The
questions presented were whether Arizona’s unusually narrow
insanity defense test, which asked only if the defendant could
distinguish between right and wrong, violated substantive due
process rights and whether an Arizona rule that excluded
virtually all expert evidence concerning mental disorder offered
for the purpose of negating mens rea violated procedural due
process. 26 Legal insanity and the presence of mens rea are
probably the criminal law issues to which free will is allegedly
most relevant, and there was extensive discussion of the
history of legal insanity and of the role of mens rea. 27
Nevertheless, the Court mentions the term “free will” only
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 2.09(1).
Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006).
Id. at 2716.
Id. at 2720–22, 2724–26.
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once, and only then because it is included in a quotation from
the American Psychiatric Association’s Insanity Defense Work
Group, which claimed that psychiatrists who give ultimate
opinions about legal or moral constructs such as free will
exceed their expertise and are likely to confuse juries. 28
Libertarian free will as a criterion of or foundation for criminal
responsibility was not discussed. There were many problems
with the Court’s analysis, 29 but failure to discuss free will was
not among them.
In short, free will or lack of it is not a criterion for criminal
responsibility or non-responsibility. Once again, it is irrelevant
to the actual practice of criminal law. It is true that people,
including judges, practicing lawyers and a few law professors,
talk as if free will were important in criminal law, but this is
clearly wrong as a matter of positive law. They sometimes
mean, however, that free will is a necessary foundational
justification for responsibility, even if it is not a discrete
criterion for any legal doctrine. The next part of this article,
which discusses the metaphysical free will problem,
demonstrates that having libertarian free will is not necessary
to justify responsibility doctrines and practices according to an
entirely plausible and practical resolution of the metaphysical
free will problem.
III. THE GENUINE FREE WILL PROBLEM AND
RESPONSIBILITY
Many people believe that libertarianism is a foundational
assumption for law. They believe that responsibility is possible
only if we genuinely possess contra-causal freedom. Thus, if we
do not have this extraordinary capacity, they fear that many
legal doctrines and practices, especially those relating to
responsibility, may be entirely incoherent. As we shall see,
however, metaphysical libertarianism is not a necessary
support for current responsibility doctrines and practices.
Only a small number of philosophers and scientists believe
that human beings possess libertarian freedom of action and
will, which has been termed a “panicky” metaphysics 30 because
28. Id. at 2736.
29. Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between
Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2008).
30. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59, 80 (G.
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it is so implausible. 31 Most philosophers and scientists believe
that the universe is deterministic or universally caused, or
nearly so, especially above the sub-atomic level. There is no
uncontroversial definition of determinism and we will never be
able to confirm that it is true or not. As a working definition,
however, let us assume, roughly, that all events have causes
that operate according to the physical laws of the universe and
that were themselves caused by those same laws operating on
prior states of the universe in a continuous thread of causation
going back to the first state.
Even if this assumption is too strong, the universe seems
so sufficiently regular and lawful that rationality demands that
we must adopt the hypothesis that universal causation is
approximately correct. 32 If determinism is true, the people we
are and the actions we perform have been caused by a chain of
causation over which we mostly had no rational control and for
which we could not possibly be responsible. People do not have
contra-causal freedom. How can responsibility be possible for
action or for anything else in such a universe? How can it be
rational and fair for civil and criminal law to hold anyone
accountable for anything, including blaming and punishing
people because they allegedly deserve it?
It is important to understand that, for the determinist,
biological causes, including those arising from the brain, pose
no new or more powerful general metaphysical challenge to
responsibility than non-biological or social causes.
As a
conceptual and empirical matter, humans do not necessarily
have more control over psychological or social causal variables
than over biological causal variables. More important, in a
world of universal causation or determinism, biological
causation creates no greater threat to a person’s life hopes than
psychological or social causation.
For purposes of the
metaphysical free will debate, a cause is just a cause, whether
it is neurological, genetic, psychological, sociological, or
astrological. Neuroscience is simply the newest “bogey” in a
dispute about the general possibility of responsibility that has
Watson ed., 1982).
31. HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 42–51 (1998).
32. Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of
Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3, 12 (1989) (terming this hypothesis the “realism
constraint”).

MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36.

2008] DETERMINISM & THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCH.

15

been ongoing for millennia. Though it is more scientifically
respectable than earlier bogeys, such as astrology and
psychoanalysis, and appears to produce very compelling
graphic representations of the brain, 33 neuroscience evidence
for causation does no more work in the general free
will/responsibility debate than other kinds of causal evidence.
No analysis of the determinism/responsibility problem
could conceivably persuade everyone. There are no decisive,
analytically incontrovertible arguments to resolve the
metaphysical question.
Moreover, the question is
metaphysical, not scientific. Indeed, the debate is so fraught
that even theorists who adopt the same general approach to the
metaphysical challenge substantially disagree. Nevertheless,
as I shall argue, compatibilism is a plausible metaphysical

33. These brain graphics are almost always misleading to those who do
not understand how they are constructed. We have long become accustomed
to seeing in the media and elsewhere what appear to be pictures of the brain
with various superimposed shaded areas (which can be in any color the
investigator wishes), indicating which region was activated by the stimulus
presented. These are not pictures of the brain, however, and they do not
necessarily reflect the activity in any individual brain. The underlying brain
image is a “standardized” brain structure, whereas we know that there is
enormous variation in the structure of individual brains, much as there is
enormous variation in all the biological structures of the body.
The
superimposed shaded areas indicate that in that region there was a change in
activity from base rate activity, but the activity being measured is not neural
activity. Rather, the shading discloses (with a short time lag) changes in blood
oxygenation, which is thought to be a good proxy for neural activation in that
area. Finally, the shaded areas do not show actual activity. Instead, they are
computer generated statistical postdictions of the likelihood that the change
was produced by the stimuli rather than by a random fluctuation in activity
level. In a sense, these images are pictorial representations of a confidence
interval, and they represent an average that may not be the true value for any
individual subject in the study. See CHRIS FRITH, MAKING UP THE MIND: HOW
THE BRAIN CREATES OUR MENTAL WORLD 116–17 fig.CP2 (2007).
It is also the case that when a claim is allegedly backed by brain
imaging evidence, non-experts rate the scientific reasoning supporting the
claim to be superior to such reasoning based on equally persuasive evidence of
other sorts. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning (2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Cognition). Moreover, non-experts are
more likely to believe the claim even if the neuroscience is actually irrelevant
to the logic of the explanation. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive
Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 1, 6 (2008).
Much of this misunderstanding has been attributed to misleading reports of
neuroscience in the media. Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI. 159, 159–60 (2005). See infra text accompanying
notes 56–61 for a more recent example.
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contender in the debate and thus we are warranted in thinking
that determinism is not inconsistent with facts about human
behavior we have reason to believe and with legal and moral
practices we adopt in light of those facts.
A. HARD DETERMINISM
Hard determinism holds that free will and determinism
are inconsistent, that free will is necessary for moral
responsibility, that determinism is true, and therefore that no
one can be morally responsible for one’s actions. 34 This theory
does not try either to explain or to justify our responsibility
concepts and practices. It simply assumes that genuine
responsibility is metaphysically unjustified. For example, a
central hard determinist argument is that people can be
responsible only if they could have acted otherwise than they
did, but they could not have acted differently if determinism is
true. 35 Consequently, the hard determinist claims that even if
an internally coherent account of responsibility and related
practices can be given, it will be a superficial basis for
responsibility, which is only an illusion. 36 There is no real or
ultimate responsibility. Hard determinists properly concede
that western systems of law and morality hold some people
accountable and excuse some people, but they argue there is no
genuinely justifiable basis for distinguishing responsible from
non-responsible people. Hard determinism thus provides an
external critique of responsibility. If determinism is true and is
genuinely inconsistent with responsibility, then no one can ever
be “really” or “ultimately” responsible for anything and
responsibility attributions cannot properly justify further
action. The question, then, is whether as rational agents we
must swallow our pride, accept hard determinism because it is
so self-evidently true and somehow transform the legal system
and our moral practices accordingly.

34. SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION 4 (2000).
35. This is sometimes called the “principle of alternate possibilities.” It
has generated endless disputes between incompatibilists, who believe it is
flatly inconsistent with responsibility, and compatibilists, who believe that it
is not inconsistent with responsibility. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 115–
17, 251–65.
36. See SMILANSKY, supra note 34, at 40–73, 145–219 (arguing that free
will is an illusion, but an illusion that is indispensable).
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B. COMPATIBILISM
Compatibilists, who agree with incompatibilist hard
determinists that determinism is true, have three basic
answers to the incompatibilist challenge. First, they claim that
responsibility attributions and related practices are human
activities constructed by us for good reason and that they need
not conform to any ultimate metaphysical facts about genuine
or “ultimate” responsibility. 37 Indeed, some compatibilists
deny that conforming to ultimate metaphysical facts is even a
coherent goal in this context. 38 Second, compatibilism holds
that positive doctrines of responsibility are fully consistent with
determinism. 39 Third, compatibilists believe that responsibility
doctrines and practices are normatively desirable and
consistent with moral, legal, and political theories that we
firmly embrace. 40 The first claim is theoretical; the third is
primarily normative. There are very powerful arguments for
the first and third claims. For the present purpose, however,
which is addressed to whether free will is foundational for law,
the second claim is the most important.
Let us begin with the most general responsibility and
excusing conditions. Recall that the capacity for rationality is
the primary responsibility criterion and its lack is the primary
excusing condition. Human beings have different capacities for
rationality in general and in specific contexts. For example,
young children in general have less developed rational capacity
than adults. It is also true that rationality differences affect
agents’ capacity to grasp and to be guided by good reason.
Differences in rational capacity and its effects are real even if
Compulsion is also an excusing
determinism is true. 41
condition, but it is simply another fact about human beings
that some people act in response to external or internal hard
choice threats to which persons of reasonable firmness might
yield and most people, most of the time, are not in such
situations when they act. This is true even if determinism is
true and even if people could not have acted otherwise.
37. Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results and Criminal Responsibility, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 438–39.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 440–42.
40. Id. at 443–44; see James Lenman, Compatibilism and Contractualism:
The Possibility of Moral Responsibility, 117 ETHICS 7 (2006).
41. See Morse, supra note 37, at 441.
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For a specific example, consider again the doctrines of
criminal responsibility. Assume that the defendant has caused
a prohibited harm. Prima facie responsibility requires that the
defendant’s behavior was an act and performed with a requisite
mental state. Now it is true that some bodily movements are
intentional and performed in a state of reasonably integrated
consciousness and some are not. It is also true that some
defendants possess the requisite mental state and some do not.
The truth of determinism does not entail that actions are
indistinguishable from non-actions or that different mental
states may accompany action. These facts are true and make a
perfectly rational legal difference even if determinism is true.
Determinism is fully consistent with prima facie guilt and
innocence.
Now consider the defenses of insanity and duress. Some
people with mental disorders do not know right from wrong;
others do. In cases of potential duress, some people face a hard
choice that a person of reasonable firmness would yield to and
most people do not. Once again, these differences make perfect
sense according to dominant retributive and consequential
theories of punishment. A causal account can explain how
these variations were caused to occur, but it does not mean that
these variations do not exist. Determinism is fully consistent
with both the presence and absence of affirmative defenses. In
sum, the legal criteria used to identify which defendants are
criminally responsible map onto real behavioral differences
that justify differential legal responses.
In their widely-noted paper, Joshua Greene and Jonathan
Cohen take issue with the foregoing account of the positive
foundations of legal responsibility and with my claim that it is
the “fundamental psycholegal error” to claim that causation of
behavior is per se an excusing condition for that behavior. 42
They suggest that, despite the law’s official position, most
people hold a dualistic, libertarian view of the necessary
conditions for responsibility because “vivid scientific
information about the causes of criminal behaviour leads
people to doubt certain individuals’ capacity for moral and legal

42. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1778 (2004).
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responsibility . . . .” 43
To prove their point, they use the
hypothetical of “Mr. Puppet,” a person who has been genetically
and environmentally engineered to be a very specific type of
person. 44 They correctly point out that Mr. Puppet is no
different from any other person accused of a crime, 45 say, an
identical person I shall call Mr. Puppet2, who became the same
sort of person without intentional intervention. Yet most
people might believe that Mr. Puppet is not responsible. If so,
should Mr. Puppet2 also not be responsible because he is also a
product of a gene/environment interaction? Would it not then
follow, as Greene and Cohen claim, that no one is responsible?
Green and Cohen are right about ordinary peoples’
intuitions, of course, but people make the fundamental psycholegal error all the time. This is a sociological observation and
not a justification for thinking causation or determinism does
or should excuse behavior. After all, if causation were an
excusing condition in a world of universal causation, no one
could ever be responsible. This theory is inconsistent with the
positive doctrines and practices of law and morality. Moreover,
if Mr. Puppet and Mr. Puppet2 are both rational agents, my
argument suggests that they are both justifiably held
responsible. The lure of purely mechanistic thinking about
behavior when causes are discovered is powerful, but should be
resisted.
At present, the law’s “official” position—that conscious,
intentional, rational and uncompelled agents may properly be
held responsible—is justified unless and until neuroscience or
any other discipline demonstrates convincingly that humans
are not the creatures we think we are. That is, if humans are
not conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons
that play a causal role in our behavior, then the foundational
facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken. 46 If it is true,
for example, that we are all automata, then no one is an agent,
no one is acting and, therefore, no one can be responsible for
action. This challenge, which is powerfully fueled by stunning
advances in neuroscience, is empirical and in principle capable
of resolution. Let us therefore turn to the problem of the
43. Id. at 1776, 1779.
44. Id. at 1780.
45. Id.
46. Greene and Cohen make this claim as well, which I discuss in Part IV
infra. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 42, at 1784.
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allegedly “disappearing person.”
IV. THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
DISAPPEARING PERSON
Criminal law’s view and the ordinary, common-sense view
of action is that it is performed by an agent or person who acts
for reasons that cause and explain the agent’s conduct.
Whether one explains action causally or holistically, the theory
of action presupposes that it is a person that acts based on the
person’s desires, beliefs, and intentions. 47 Agents are praised
and blamed, rewarded and punished. Because it is an agent
who acts, it makes sense to ask that person to give an account
of his or her behavior and to be held accountable. Asking a
creature or a mechanistic force that does not act to answer to
charges does not make sense. The core of agency as the
capacity to act for reasons is accepted as foundational for
responsibility. In this Part, I first address the conceptual and
speculative issues concerning agency, then I consider the
empirical evidence for thinking that we are not agents. Next, I
turn to the implications of potentially accepting the death of
folk psychology. I conclude that there is little reason at present
to believe that we are not agents.
A. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
The law’s fundamental presuppositions about personhood
and action are open to profound objection.
Most
fundamentally, action and consciousness are scientific and
conceptual mysteries. 48 We do not know how the brain enables
the mind 49 and we do not know how action is possible. At most
we have hypotheses or a priori arguments.
Moreover,
causation by mental states seems to depend on now largely
discredited mind-brain dualism that treats minds and brains as
separate entities that are somehow in communication with one
47. See ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION AND REASON 109–78 (1993).
48. See id. at 1–4 (describing the “basic philosophical divisions” in each of
the four major problem areas in action theory); COLIN MCGINN, THE
MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD (1999)
(describing the immense difficulty of explaining consciousness and doubting
the ability of human beings to do so).
49. PAUL R. MCHUGH & PHILIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF
PSYCHIATRY 11–12 (2d ed. 1998).
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another. 50 How can such tenuously understood concepts be
justifiable premises for legal practices such as blaming and
punishing? If our picture of ourselves is wrong, as many
neuroscientists claim, then our responsibility practices are
morally unjustified according to any moral theory we currently
embrace.
What if agency and folk psychology are an illusion? What
if all of the contending conceptions depend on a mistake about
human activity? What if, for example, reasons for actions and
intentions, agents’ conscious understandings of their world and
themselves do not explain actions but are simply post-hoc
rationalizations that “make sense of ” the bodily motions or
non-motions that brains produce? Some people, including
many psychologists and neuroscientists, think that new
discoveries about the causation of behavior are leading
inexorably to a purely mechanistic view of the link between the
brain and behavior, and thus to a purely mechanistic view of
human behavior. The assassin did not shoot that gun; it was
his finger that pulled the trigger, his peripheral neurons that
caused his finger muscles to contract, central neurons that
caused the peripheral neurons to fire, and so on. The assassin’s
desires, beliefs, and intentions did no genuine work in
explaining his action. These are the thoughts that terrify many
thinking people about scientific advances in the understanding
of human behavior. This is a real challenge.
Many investigators in psychology and the neurosciences
increasingly assert the challenge to agency. The seriousness of
science’s potential challenge to the traditional foundations of
law and morality is best summed up in the title of an eminent
psychologist’s recent book, The Illusion of Conscious Will. 51
Here is an extensive quotation from the conclusion, which is
necessary to obtain the tenor of the assertion and to evaluate if
it is internally logical:
50. It is almost impossible not to talk “dualistically” in ordinary speech
and writing. Every time a monist neuroscientist uses a personal pronoun in
speaking or writing, for example, he seems to imply that there is a genuine
him that is somehow distinguishable from his brain activity. This does not
mean, however, that the neuroscientist (or anyone else) is really a cryptodualist. It is simply an inevitable feature of current language, and perhaps it
always will be.
51. DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL (2002); see
also Daniel M. Wegner, Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 649 (2004). The précis is followed by open peer commentaries and
a response from Professor Wegner.
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Sometimes how things seem is more important than what they are.
This is true in theater, in art, in used car sales, in economics, and—it
now turns out—in the scientific analysis of conscious will. The fact is,
it seems to each of us that we have conscious will. It seems we have
selves. It seems we have minds. It seems we are agents. It seems we
cause what we do. Although it is sobering and ultimately accurate to
call all this an illusion, it is a mistake to conclude that the illusory is
trivial. On the contrary, the illusions piled atop apparent mental
causation are the building blocks of human psychology and social life.
It is only with the feeling of conscious will that we can begin to solve
the problems of knowing who we are as individuals, of discerning
what we can and cannot do, and of judging ourselves morally right or
wrong for what we have done. 52

Alternatively, to take another example from Greene and
Cohen, suppose that “neuroscience holds the promise of turning
the black box of the mind into a transparent bottleneck.” 53
They mean that the brain is the final mechanistic pathway
through which all types of explanations of behavior must
ultimately operate and that neuroscience will be able to
demonstrate that brain mechanisms, not mental states, are
doing all the work. 54 They speculate that we may someday
possess “extremely high-resolution scanners that can
simultaneously track the neural activity and connectivity of
every neuron in the human brain” and, that with the help of
computers and software, can help people see the neural events
that are alone causally responsible for their behavior. 55 If such
mechanistic understanding and knowledge were available and
widespread, Greene and Cohen are probably correct that
notions of responsibility would wither away because most
would believe that it was the brain that “did it,” not the agent,
and we do not hold brains morally responsible.
This picture of human activity exerts a strong pull on the
52. WEGNER, supra note 51, at 341–42. In more recent work, Professor
Wegner appears to have softened the radical interpretation of his claim, which
is that we, as persons, as agents, are not really “controllers” whose mental
processes cause action. Daniel M. Wegner, Who is the Controller of Controlled
Processes?, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 19, 32 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2005)
(“This theory is mute on whether thought does cause action.”). On the other
hand, Professor Wegner seems ambivalent and loathes fully giving up the
radical interpretation. See id. at 27 (arguing that the “experience of conscious
will is normally a construction” and referring to mental causation as
“apparent”). This apparent ambivalence is present in the work of others.
53. Greene & Cohen, supra note 42, at 1781.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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popular, educated imagination as well as on the theorizing of
scientists. Consider the following example. In an ingenious
recent study, 56 investigators were able to predict accurately
based on which part of the brain was physiologically active
whether a shopper-subject would or would not make a
purchase. Activity in these regions predicted immediately
subsequent purchases “above and beyond self-report
variables.” 57 As we shall see in the next sub-section, this does
not mean that the person’s weighing of preferences and prices
and the final decision played no role. Activity in the nucleus
accumbens, the insula, and the mesial prefrontal cortex is not
“weighing” and “deciding.” The latter are the activities of
people, not brains. 58 The findings interestingly, although
unsurprisingly, suggest, however, that specific brain regions
play a crucial role in particular types of psychological
processes.
This study was reported in the Science Times section of the
New York Times by John Tierney. 59 Here is how the story was
“spun,” beginning with its title: Findings: The Voices in My
Head Say “Buy It!” Why Argue? The shopper is simply the
hapless puppet of brain processes and plays no role as an agent
in the purchase process. The decision is not up to the shopper;
it is up to his or her brain. The conclusion considers how the
study might help us deal with feckless consumerism.
You might remove the pleasure of shopping by somehow dulling the
brain’s dopamine receptors so that not even the new Apple iPhone
would get a rise in the nucleus accumbens, but try getting anyone to
stay on that medication. Better the occasional jolt of pain. Charge it
to the insula. 60

In addition to getting the study wrong—insula activation
was associated with excessive prices and the decision not to
56. Brian Knutson et al., Neural Predictors of Purchases, 53 NEURON 147
(2007).
57. Id. at 147.
58. M.R. Bennett & P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of
Neuroscience: An Excerpt from Chapter 3, in NEUROSCIENCE & PHILOSOPHY:
BRAIN, MIND & LANGUAGE 15, 18–23 (Maxwell Bennett et al. eds., 2007)
(describing ascription of psychological attributes to the brain as “senseless”).
But see, Daniel Dennett, Philosophy as Naive Anthropology: Comment on
Bennett and Hacker, in NEUROSCIENCE & PHILOSOPHY: BRAIN, MIND &
LANGUAGE, supra at 73, 86–88 (claiming that it makes sense to attribute
“attenuated” sorts of psychological attributes to parts of the brain).
59. John Tierney, Findings: The Voices in My Head Say “Buy It!” Why
Argue?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at F1.
60. Id.
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purchase 61 —it betrays once again the mechanistic view of
human activity. What people do is simply a product of brain
regions and neurotransmitters. The person disappears. There
is no shopper. There is only a brain in a mall.
If accounts such as these from both scientists and the
media are correct and their implications were properly
understood, rationality would require either that we abandon
agency-based conceptions and practices of responsibility or that
we learn to live with the illusion that we are agents. The rich
explanatory apparatus of intentionality is simply a post-hoc
rationalization we hapless homo sapiens construct to explain
what our brains have already done. We are just mechanisms,
although the illusion of conscious will may play a positive role
in our lives. 62 Let us call this the “No Action Thesis” (NAT).
If these doubts about folk psychology and agency are
accurate, compatibilism cannot save responsibility because
determinism is consistent with either of two inconsistent views
of human behavior. The truth of determinism is consistent
with the existence or non-existence of agency, with the causal
role or non-causal role of mental states in explaining behavior.
Responsibility depends on agency, on the causal role of mental
states, and the new discoveries arguably deny the possibility of
agency as it is traditionally conceived.
Before turning to the actual evidence for NAT, let us
consider some conceptual difficulties, using Greene and Cohen’s
“transparent bottleneck” argument. I will assume that the
scanning and computing abilities that the argument employs
are possible, although the brain has 1011 cells and at least 1015
connections. 63 The real problem with the argument is not that
61. Id.
62. This claim should not be confused with the apparently similar claim
that “personhood” is an illusion. See Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein,
Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS
37, 40 (2007) (claiming that our construct of “personhood” is simply the
illusory product of innate and automatic brain systems that is “projected” onto
the world). There are many problems with the logic of this claim, but even if it
is correct, it does not deny that creatures like us have mental states, such as
desires and beliefs, that can be causally explanatory. Most charitably
interpreted, it simply denies the explanatory usefulness of the normative
concept of a “person.”
63. Is it really likely, however, that the computer would predict what
precise sentences we would speak? At present, of course, the speculation is
pure science fiction and, in my opinion, is likely to remain so.
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it assumes a (barely) plausible computational ability, but that
it appears to assume the validity of a complete reduction of
mind to mental states at the level of (apparently) neural
networks. Such reductivism is controversial, however, even
among monists who believe that the brain produces the mind,
which is realizable in the brain. 64 Indeed, the complete postEnlightenment project of reducing all phenomena to the most
basic physical building blocks is also controversial and almost
certainly a chimera. Until we have the science to demonstrate
that such reduction is possible and that it is the best
explanation of mental states, there is no reason to foresee the
end of responsibility.
It is possible, of course, that our ability to predict behavior
using new neuroscience techniques may become so successful
that we will abandon responsibility concepts and practices not
because responsibility is impossible, but because the
consequential attractions of the potential for social engineering
are so great. In this sense, the practical use of responsibility
practices may hang by a technological thread. 65 But this is
distinguishable from abandoning responsibility because we are
not agents. After all, much of our behavior much of the time is
predictable—such as being polite at professional meetings—but
this does not mean we are not responsible for such predictable
behavior. It is also possible that when we do discover how the
brain enables the mind (assuming that this is possible) it will
so profoundly alter our understanding of ourselves as biological
creatures that all moral and political notions will change. 66
Nevertheless, this argument is different from claiming that we
are not agents, that our mental states do no explanatory work.
B. THE EVIDENCE FOR THE “NO ACTION THESIS”
The real NAT question is whether scientific and clinical
64. See Carl F. Craver, Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield
Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience, 36 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL
& BIOMEDICAL SCI. 373, 375 (2005) (claiming that reduction models have
“shortcomings” and that non-reductive physicalism is now a “standard view in
the philosophy of mind”).
65. Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265,
294–303 (1999).
66. See CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE
MOSAIC UNITY OF NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2007) (suggesting that if mysteries such as
consciousness are solved, “[I]t will revise our self-conception as radically as . . .
Darwin’s humbling of our origins.”).
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investigations have shown that action is rare or non-existent;
that conscious will is largely or entirely an illusion. Four kinds
of indirect evidence are often adduced: first, demonstrations
that a very large part of our activity is undeniably caused by
variables we are not in the slightest aware of; second, studies
indicating that more activity than we think takes place when
our consciousness is divided or diminished; third, laboratory
studies that show that people can be experimentally misled
about their causal contribution to their apparent behavior; and,
fourth, evidence that particular types of psychological processes
seem to have their biological substrate in specific regions of the
brain. None of these types of evidence offers logical support to
NAT, however.
Just because a person may not be aware of all the causes
for why he formed an intention does not mean that he did not
form an intention, that he was not a fully conscious agent when
he did so, and that his intention played no causal role in
explaining the person’s behavior. Even if human beings were
never aware of the causes of their intentions to act and of their
actions, it would not necessarily follow that they were not
acting consciously, intentionally and for reasons that make
eminent sense to anyone under the circumstances.
Human consciousness can undeniably be divided or
diminished by a wide variety of normal and abnormal causes. 67
We have known this long before contemporary scientific
discoveries of what causes such states and how they correlate
with brain structure and processes. Law and morality agree
that if an agent’s capacity for consciousness is non-culpably
diminished, responsibility is likewise diminished.
Some
suggest that it is diminished because bodily movements in the
absence of fully integrated consciousness are not “actions.” 68
Others believe that apparently goal-directed behavior that is
responsive to the environment, such as sleepwalking, is action,
67. See JEFFREY L. CUMMINGS & MICHAEL S. MEGA, NEUROPSYCHIATRY
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 333–43 (2003) (description of dissociative
and related states and their causes and treatments); D. Vaitl, et al.,
Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 98
(2005).
68. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 49–52, 135–155, 257–58
(1993) (arguing that cases of compromised consciousness should be treated as
non-action); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1749, 1804–20 (1994).
AND

MORSE S. DETERMINISM AND THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: TWO CHALLENGES TO
RESPONSIBILITY FROM NEUROSCIENCE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):1-36.

2008] DETERMINISM & THE DEATH OF FOLK PSYCH.

27

but that it should be excused because diminished consciousness
reduces the capacity for rationality. 69 Let us assume that the
former view is correct, because it offers more direct support to
NAT and therefore the greatest challenge to traditional notions
of individual responsibility. Let us also assume that divided or
diminished consciousness is more common than it appears to
be. Nevertheless, neither of these assumptions supports the
more radical, general NAT thesis.
Demonstrating that divided or partial consciousness is
more common than it appears certainly extends the range of
cases in which people are not responsible or have diminished
responsibility. Such studies do not demonstrate, however, that
most human bodily movements that appear intentional and
rational (apparently rational actions) occur when the person
has altered consciousness. 70 One cannot generalize to all
human behavior from genuinely deviant cases or cases in which
a known abnormality is present. A model of action (or, we
should say, non-action) built on sleepwalking, for example, is
hardly a threat to orthodox notions of individual responsibility.
There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that
laboratory manipulations of unsuspecting subjects can cause
the subjects to believe that their intentions were producing
action when this was not the case. 71 That subjects can be
cleverly misled by experimental manipulations hardly indicates
that intentions generally play no role in explaining our
behavior. Self-deception under laboratory conditions of deceit
does not entail that intentions generally do not causally explain
action.
Finally, there is accumulating evidence that various
69. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587,
1641–52 (1994) (arguing that clouded consciousness should be treated as an
affirmative defense); see also Bernard Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr.
Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661 (1994) (arguing that human activity with
clouded consciousness is action).
70. Accord John F. Kihlstrom, The Automaticity Juggernaut—or, Are We
Automatons After All?, in ARE WE FREE? PSYCHOLOGY AND FREE WILL 155173 (John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister eds. 2008)
(reviewing the literature of and the explanation for the claim that virtually all
behavior is automatic and concluding that the experimental literature on
automatic behavior does not support such a sweeping assertion).
71. See John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the
Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra
note 52, at 37, 51–54 (2005) (reviewing the evidence and concluding that the
“will” is not primarily responsible for action).
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psychological processes have their biological substrates in
localized regions of the brain. We have long known that many
behavioral activities are biologically based in highly specific
regions. For example, the ability to recognize faces is highly
localized in a region of the temporal lobe of the right
hemisphere referred to as the “fusiform face area.” Should this
area become lesioned, the subject loses the ability to recognize
Now, however,
faces, a condition called prosopagnosia. 72
functional neuroimaging techniques permit the exploration of
brain activity during more complicated psychological processes
and can identify biological substrates for the processes. I have
already discussed the example of brain regions associated with
decisions to purchase an object. 73 For another example, a
recent study demonstrated that investigators could determine
from the region of brain activity which mental process—adding
or subtracting—a subject had covertly intended to, but had not
yet, performed. 74
The localization evidence is immensely interesting and
suggestive, but it does not indicate that mental states play no
role in causally explaining behavior. There must be a biological
substrate in the brain for all human behavior. If your brain is
dead, you are dead and not behaving at all. Nor is it surprising
that particular regions of the brain are associated with
particular psychological processes. For example, a leading,
albeit controversial, theory of how the mind works suggests
that it is composed of different systems that perform different
functions. 75 Although we do not know how the brain enables
72. James W. Tanaka, Object Categorization, Expertise, and Neural
Plasticity, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III 877, 883 (Michael S.
Gazzaniga ed., 3d ed. 2004).
73. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
74. John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human
Brain, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY 323, 323–28 (2007). It is important to recognize
that the brain activity accurately predicted only which type of process the
subject had covertly formed the intention to perform. It did not identify the
specific content of the intention, such as which two numbers the subject
intended to add or subtract. Despite the enormous advances in cognitive
neuroscience, we do not know how to read minds using neuroimaging or any
other technique. Cf., Martha J. Farah, Bioethical Issues in the Cognitive
Neurosciences, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III, supra note 72, at 1309,
1309–10 (referring to the ability to identify traits and states as “a crude form
of mindreading”).
75. See, e.g., JERRY A. FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF MIND (1983)
(providing a strict modular theory).
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the mind, it makes sense to assume that specific psychological
processes would have brain substrates specific to each
individual process. Based on what we already know about
localization and on the reasonable assumption that it would be
inefficient if all regions of the brain needed equal activation to
support all psychological processes, localization is most likely to
be true. Even if all this is correct, however, it does not follow
that mental states do no causal explanatory work.
It
demonstrates at most that the neural network substrates for
specific mental functions may be located in specific regions of
the brain.
What is needed to support NAT is a general and direct
demonstration that causal intentionality is an illusion tout
court, but no such general demonstration has yet been
produced by scientific study. The most interesting evidence has
arisen from studies done by neuroscientist, Benjamin Libet, 76
which have generated an immense amount of comment. 77
Indeed, many claim that Libet’s work is the first direct
neurophysiological evidence of NAT. 78 Libet’s exceptionally
creative and careful studies demonstrate that measurable
electrical brain activity associated with intentional actions
occurs in the relevant motor area of the brain about 550
milliseconds before the subject actually acts and about 350-400
milliseconds before the subject is consciously aware of the
intention to act.
Let us assume, with cautious reservations, 79 the basic
scientific methodological validity of these studies. 80 The crucial
question then becomes whether the interpretation of these
76. Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will, in THE VOLITIONAL BRAIN:
TOWARDS A NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL 47 (Benjamin Libet et al. eds.,
1999) (summarizing the findings and speculating about their implications).
77. WEGNER, supra note 51, at 54–55 (characterizing the recounting of
Libet’s results as a “cottage industry” and noting the large and contentious
body of commentary).
78. William P. Banks & Susan Pockett, Benjamin Libet’s Work on the
Neuroscience of Free Will, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS
657, 658 (Max Velmans & Susan Schneider eds., 2007).
79. See, e.g., HENRIK WALTER, NEUROPHILOSOPHY OF FREE WILL: FROM
LIBERTARIAN ILLUSIONS TO A CONCEPT OF NATURAL AUTONOMY 250–252
(Cynthia Klor trans., 2001); Jing Zhu, Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative
Interpretation of Libet’s Experiment, J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., Nov. 2003, at
61, 61–77.
80. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 659–662 (concluding after a
careful review of possible artifacts that “[R]eadiness potentials do start before
the subject consciously ‘decides’ to move.”).
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findings as supporting NAT is valid. It does not follow from
this temporal ordering that conscious intentionality does no
causal work. It simply demonstrates that non-conscious brain
events precede conscious experience. This seems precisely
what one would expect of the mind-brain. Electrical impulses
move quickly among neurons, but some lag between brain
activity and conscious experience seems unsurprising. Once
again, if the brain is dead, the person is dead. Prior electrical
activity does not mean that intentionality played no causal role.
Electrical activity in the brain is precisely that: electrical
activity in the brain and not a mental state such as a decision
or an intention. A readiness potential is not a decision. 81
Moreover, Libet does not carefully distinguish between
urges or wants on the one hand and decisions and intentions on
the other. 82 Indeed, Alfred Mele argues that the experimental
evidence is much more consistent with the readiness potential
being associated with an urge rather than with an intention or
a decision. 83 A perfectly plausible reading of Libet’s work is
that various non-conscious causal variables, including nonconscious urges, precede action—who would have thought
otherwise?—but intentionality is nonetheless necessary for
action.
Libet also suggests that people can “veto” the act during
the delay between becoming aware of the intention and
performing the intended action, which he surprisingly
conceives of as an undetermined act. Other researchers appear
to have localized the part of the brain that is the substrate for
this activity of vetoing. 84 But, in addition to the implausibility
of the veto being undetermined, 85 the conceptual foundations of
the interpretation that the subjects were exercising a genuine
veto are shaky at best. 86 This suggestion undermines the claim
that the brain is doing all the work because it is an agent’s
81. See ALFRED R. MELE, FREE WILL AND LUCK 30–46 (2006).
82. Id. at 33; see also M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE 228–31 (2003) (criticizing Libet’s account of
action).
83. MELE, supra note 81, at 33, 40.
84. See Marcel Brass & Patrick Haggard, To Do or Not to Do: The Neural
Signature of Self-Control, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9141, 9144 (2007) (identifying
the part of the brain that is activated when the “veto” is exercised).
85. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 667.
86. MELE, supra note 81, at 34–35.
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mental state, a newly formed intention to veto, that causes the
agent not to perform the act.
In short, Libet’s work
presupposes agency at every step in the process.
Finally, Libet’s task involved “random” finger movements
that involved no deliberation whatsoever and no rational
motivation for the specific movements involved. 87 This is a far
cry from the behavioral concerns of the criminal law or
morality, which address intentional conduct in contexts when
there is always good reason to refrain from harming another or
to act beneficently. In fact, it is at present an open question
whether Libet’s paradigm is representative of intentional
actions in general because Libet used such trivial behavior. 88
Libet’s work is fascinating, but it does not prove that
humans are generally not conscious, intentional agents or
capable of employing their conscious intentionality when they
Even if the work is
have good reason to do so. 89
methodologically valid, various conceptual and interpretive
arguments undermine the claim that Libet has demonstrated
that NAT is true.
In short, despite the often astonishing findings and
impressive advances in neuroscience and allied disciplines,
there is no compelling evidence yet that NAT is generally true.
Future discoveries may undermine this conclusion, however, so
in the next subsection I turn to the implications of NAT.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF NAT
NAT provides no guidance about what people should do
next and, in any event, degenerates into self-referential
incoherence.
Suppose that you were convinced by the
mechanistic view that you were not an intentional, rational
agent after all. (Of course, the notion of being “convinced”
would be an illusion, too. 90 Being convinced means that you
87. Participating in the study and cooperating with the investigator can
be rationally motivated, of course. But the experimental task was to move
one’s finger randomly, for no good reason.
88. Banks & Pockett, supra note 78, at 662–63.
89. See Jerry Fodor, Making the Connection, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, May 17, 2002, at 4 (arguing that the new neuroscience rarely
has much to contribute when the phenomenon in question is complex social
behavior).
90. See Daniel C. Dennett, Calling in the Cartesian Loans, 27 BEHAV.
BRAIN SCI. 661, 661 (2004) (wondering, in response to Professor Wegner, who
is this “we” that inhabits the brain).
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were persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is
not persuaded by anything. It is simply neurophysically
transformed.) What should you do now? You know that it is an
illusion to think that your deliberations and intentions have
any causal efficacy in the world. (Again, what does it mean
according to the purely mechanistic view to “know” something?
But enough.) You also know, however, that you experience
sensations such as pleasure and pain and that you care about
what happens to you and to the world. You cannot just sit
quietly and wait for your neurons to fire. You cannot wait for
determinism to happen.
You must, and will of course,
deliberate and act.
If one still thought that NAT were correct and that
standard notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert are
therefore impossible, one might nevertheless continue to
believe that the law would not necessarily have to give up the
concept of incentives. Through poorly-understood automatic
processes, it is possible that various potential rewards and
punishments would shape behavior even if they did not do so as
premises in practical reasoning. Such an account would be
consistent with “black box” accounts of economic incentives.
For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of
human behavior entails complete consequentialism, such a
conclusion might not be unwelcome.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same
internal contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the
“agent” that is discovering the laws governing how incentives
shape behavior? Could understanding and providing incentives
via social norms and legal rules simply be epiphenomenal
interpretations of what the brain has already done? How do
“we” “decide” which behaviors to reward or punish? What role
does “reason”—a property of thought and agents, not a property
of brains—play in this “decision”? Once again, the NAT account
seems to swallow itself.
Moreover, NAT proponents of
consequentialism could hardly complain about those who refuse
to “accept” what the proponents think rationality requires. The
allegedly misguided people who resist are simply the victims of
their automatic brain states. They cannot be expected
intentionally to use their capacity for reason to accept what the
consequentialists believe reason demands.
Indeed, the
consequentialist’s belief is also an illusory mental state or it
exists but plays no role in explaining behavior.
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Even if our mental states play no genuinely causal role
(about which, once again, we will never be certain until we
solve the mind-body problem) human beings will find it almost
impossible not to treat themselves as rational, intentional
agents unless there are major changes in the way our brains
work. Moreover, if one uses the truth of pure mechanism as a
premise in deciding what to do, this premise yields no
particular moral, legal or political conclusions. It will provide
no guide to how one should live or how one should respond to
the truth of NAT.
D. REASONS TO REJECT NAT
Answers to the possibility of NAT are rooted in common
sense, a plausible theory of mind, and practical necessity.
Virtually every neurologically intact person consistently has
the experience of first person agency, the experience that one’s
intentions flow from one’s desires and beliefs and result in
action. Indeed, this folk-psychological experience is so central
to human life and so apparently explanatory that it is difficult
to imagine giving it up or a good reason to do so, even if it were
possible to give it up. As the eminent philosopher of mind,
Jerry Fodor, has written:
[I]f commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse, that
would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in
the history of our species; if we’re that wrong about the mind, then
that’s the wrongest we’ve ever been about anything. The collapse of
the supernatural, for example, didn’t compare. . . . Nothing except,
perhaps, our commonsense physics . . . comes as near our cognitive
core as intentional explanation does. We’ll be in deep, deep trouble if
we have to give it up. . . .
. . . But be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right. 91

Moreover, the folk-psychological theory has much
explanatory power and is capable of scientific investigation. 92
Finally, it is hard to imagine the nature of a scientific study
that would prove conclusively to creatures that have created
91. JERRY A. FODOR, PSYCHOSEMANTICS: THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, at xii (1987).
92. See, e.g., BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR:
FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (2004) (providing a

full theoretical account and empirical support). There is also growing
recognition within psychology that “mental-state inference is one of the most
fundamental tools of social cognition.” Bertram F. Malle, Folk Theory of Mind:
Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition, in THE NEW
UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 52, at 225, 229.
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that study and will assess it with mental states that mental
states do no work.
The plausible theory of mind that might support such
explanations is thoroughly material, but non-reductive and
non-dualist. It hypothesizes that all mental and behavioral
activity is the causal product of lawful physical events in the
brain, that mental states are real, that they are caused by
lower level biological processes in the brain, that they are
realized in the brain—the mind-brain—but not at the level of
neurons, and that mental states can be causally efficacious. 93
Moreover, there is a perfectly plausible evolutionary story
about why folk psychology is causally explanatory and why
human beings need rules such as those provided by law. We
have evolved to be self-conscious creatures that act for reasons.
Practical reason is inescapable for creatures like ourselves who
inevitably care about the ends they pursue and about what
reason they have to act in one way rather than another. 94
Because we are social creatures whose interactions are not
governed primarily by innate repertoires, it is inevitable that
rules will be necessary to help order our interactions in any
minimally complex social group. 95 As a profoundly social
species, it seems apparent that our ancestors would have been
much less successful, and therefore much less likely to be our
ancestors, if they were unable to understand the intentions of
others, not sure they could convert their intentions into action,
and were not also equipped with powerful assumptions that
that stranger coming over the hill is equipped with the same
capacity for harmful intentions as they are. 96 The ubiquitous
93. See, e.g., Searle, supra note 6, at 113–14 (terming his position
“biological naturalism” about consciousness).
94. BOK, supra note 31, at 75–91, 129–31, 146–51 (1998).
95. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES:
MORALITY, RULES AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 11–25 (2001) (explaining why
rules are necessary in a complex society and contrasting their account with
H.L.A. Hart’s theory).
96. See Justin N. Wood et al., The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed
Action in Nonhuman Primates, 317 SCIENCE 1402, 1405 (2007) (demonstrating
that the ability to understand the intentions of other creatures evolved in
primates 40 million years ago); see also Esther Herrmann et al., Humans Have
Developed Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence
Hypothesis, 317 SCIENCE 1360 (2007) (comparing chimpanzees and
orangutans to two-and-a-half-year-old humans and discovering that they have
approximately equal cognitive skills concerning the physical world, but that
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and centrality of mental states suggests that they are very
evolutionarily expensive if they play no causal role in peoples’
lives.
Human beings have developed extraordinarily diverse
ways of living together, but a ubiquitousness feature of all
societies is that they are governed by rules addressed to beings
capable of following those rules. As Fodor notes, one of the
most basic, well-justified assumptions about human nature is
that we are consciously intentional creatures that are capable
of a great deal of rationality. At the very least, we remain
entitled to presume that conscious intentions are causal and to
place the burden of persuasion at a very high level on those
who wish to substitute another account.
In sum, the allegedly disappearing person is fully visible,
well, and continues to act for good reasons, including the
reasons not yet to accept NAT.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an avalanche of new neuroscience in both
scientific journals and the popular media. The legal and social
implications of this work seem very troublesome. As a special
report on neuroscience in The Economist warned, “Genetics
may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society
homogeneous, and gut the concept of human nature. But
neuroscience could do all of these things first.” 97 In a more
recent editorial, the same newspaper direly reported that
“modern neuroscience is eroding the idea of free will.” 98 The
editorial argued that free will is necessary for responsibility
and that “science will shrink the space in which free will can
operate by slowly exposing the mechanism of decision
making.” 99
For the reasons I have given, I believe that these warnings
are not conceptually and empirically justified, but they clearly
represent a particular view that the new neuroscience
engenders. Because agency and responsibility are so central to
our interpersonal and moral lives, so central to our conception
of ourselves, and so tied to notions of dignity and autonomy, I
humans have superior cognitive skills for understanding social interaction).
97. Open Your Mind; The Ethics of Brain Science, ECONOMIST, May 25,
2002, at 77, 77.
98. Free to Choose?, supra note 4, at 16.
99. Id.
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hope that we will always have reason to reject the view that we
are not agents and responsibility is impossible. At present,
however, we are justified in believing that we are agents and
can be responsible.

